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PART I: INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical
framework for research in a broadened and redefined field of
international human resource studies. Interest in international
aspects of human resource management (HRM) and policy has
increased markedly in recent years'. This should not be
surprising, given the growing importance of international
economic activity in general, and, in particular, the increased
mobility of technology, capital, and human resources across
national boundaries. We are concerned that current research
falling under this label is both too narrowly conceived and
ignores important work from allied areas and disciplines. We
also believe that the theoretical appeal and practical value of
this work would be strengthened by includng contributions from a
broader array of scholars, policy makers, and practitioners who
share interests in employment and industrial relations issues.
Limitations of Contemporary International HRM Research
To date, the majority of international HRM has focused on
providing insights and advice to firms on how to select and
manage expatriate managers in international job assignments
(Zeira and Banai 1984: Mendenhall, Dunbar, and Oddou 1987;
Dowling and Schuler 1990; Tung 1988; Napier 1991; Von Glinow
1991). A second, parallel body of work addresses the challenges
to firms of developing managers with international exposure,
experience, and understanding (Mendenhall and Oddou 1985; Doz and
Prahalad 1986; Galbraith and Kazanjian 1986; Evans, Doz, and
Laurent 1989; Black and Mendenhall 1990). While these issues are
of practical importance to personnel managers, this work suffers
from the same conceptual and normative limitations of much of the
traditional domestic personnel research that recent human
resource scholars have been attempting to overcome: it focuses
too narrowly on functional activities and lacks a deep
theoretical structure. Thus the work is largely an extension of
the field of personnel and human resource management designed to
speak to the needs of multinational or transnational firms. Much
of the literature also continues to be written from an American
rather than an international perspective (Boyacigillerand Adler
1991).
A third, more theoretically-drivenbody of work challenges
the concept of convergence on an American model of HRM, but tends
to focus on cultural explanations to the exclusion of the
political, economic, institutional, and strategic contexts in
which multinational firms operate (Hofstede 1980; Hofstede et.
al. 1990; Adler 1982, 1983, 1986; Laurent 1986; Ronen 1986; Adler
and Ghadar 1990). As in the case of the literature described
above, this work is also oriented towards providing advice to
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improve the performance of individual firms and managers.
In brief, the current literature in international HRM
defines the field too narrowly. As a result, it ignores many of
the most challenging questions and theoretical implications for
modern employment relations that flow from the expansion of
international economic, political, technical, and organizational
interdependence. Moreover, it is heavily dominated by a
discussion of concepts and issues with little or no backing in
systematic empirical research.
As we outline below, it is around a broader set of questions
that a field of international human resource studies should be
built. This broader set of questions requires an
interdisciplinary framework. Understanding, for example, how
employment relationships are affected by the internationalization
of capital, labor, technology, and product markets requires
scholars to consider research from the fields of political
economy, the economics of human resources and internal labor
markets, industrial relations, and international human resource
management. Similarly, explaining variations in human resource
practices and employment relations within and across industries
and nations requires researchers to combine both micro (firm and
below) and macro (regional, national, and international) levels
of analysis.
Furthermore, if we are to be true to the perspective of
industrial relations as well as the broader concerns of social
science, we need to go beyond the boundaries and normative frame
3
of reference of managers of multinational firms and the tasks
they face in structuring employment relationships for their
international (expatriate and foreign) managers and
professionals. A broader field of human resource studies should
consider the lessons and outcomes for all types of employers and
employees (not just multinational firms and their managers), as
well as for labor organizations and public policy makers. This
new definition of the field should allow researchers to take
advantage of the learning opportunities offered by. the diverse
natural experiments in human resource practices and innovations
that are occurring around the world.
Key Questions for International Human Resource Studies
Given the above critiques, what then might serve as a
broader and deeper set of questions for constructing this new
field? Consistent with our earlier efforts to add a more
strategic orientation to HRM and IR research (Dyer 1984; Kochan,
Katz, and McKersie 1986), we rely heavily on a framework that
seeks to understand the factors in a firm's external environment
and/or its governance structure that influence the choice and
consequences of human resource strategies for the different
stakeholders involved. We then propose examining how these
strategies affect critical economic and social outcomes of
interest to the firm, its employees, and the larger society and
economy.
Extending this perspective to the international arena,
however, provides an opportunity to explore more fully the basic
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question of whether, or how, human resources contribute to the
competitive advantage of individual firms and national
economies.' Moreover, by embedding the choices of individual
firms in their national settings we believe a deeper
understanding will be achieved regarding the extent to which
human resource strategies that have proven useful for producing
competitive advantage are diffused across an economy. Finally,
we believe that one of the unique contributions of an
international perspective is the opportunity to learn from
practices developed in different national and cultural settings
and assess their transferability to other national settings.
specifically, we suggest that the following questions might
provide a starting point for analysis in this field of study:
(1) What factors influence whether human resources serve as
a source of competitive advantage to individual firms and
the national economies in which they are located?
(2) How do different countries and firms go about efforts to
gain competitive advantage from their human resources? What
mix of HR strategies and policies are critical to such
efforts? How and at what levels do different parties to the
employment relationship (government, employers, workers and
their representatives) individually and jointly influence
human resource strategies and policies?
(3) What are the effects on the key outcomes of interest to
the different stakeholders in employment relationships?
While the competitive advantage and much of the strategic
HRM literature has focused on the performance of individual
firms, we believe the outcomes examined need to capture the
'We use the term competitive advantage here to refer to both
competitive and comparative advantage as previously defined in the
business strategy (Porter 1980, 1985; 1990) and the international
economics literature (Spence and Hazard 1988; Krugman 1986). In
this way we can continue to move across levels of analysis from the
firm to the nation state.
.
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interests of employees and other stakeholders as well.
Indeed, stated most broadly, we see the critical research
and pOlicy question as being: What are the effects of
alternative human resource strategies on the twin objectives
of economic performance (competitiveness) and social
welfare?
(4) How widely are practices that achieve competitive
advantage diffused within a country and what factors
influence the rate and process of diffusion?
(5) To what extent are practices that perform well in.one
setting transferable across national boundaries to perform
equally well elsewhere?
We believe these questions can and should be studied at
various levels of analysis ranging from the nation state (where
political economy literatures tend to focus) to the level of the
firm (where the labor economics and human resource management
literatures focus). At whatever level of analysis is chosen,
however, we argue that it is important to examine the
interrelationship among human resource policies and practices.
In this sense we adopt the approach of industrial relations
(Dunlop 1958; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986) and internal labor
market theorists (Doeringer and piore 1971; Osterman 1984). But
consistent with other aspects of industrial relations or internal
labor markets, the economic or market forces that influence
institutional, firm, and individual behavior need to serve as a
starting point for analyzing these questions. Thus, classical
and neoclassical economic models and their modern derivatives
often serve as the starting point for answering these questions.
6
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PART II: HUMAN RESOURCES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
Human Resources as a Source of Competitive Advantaqe
Classical and neoclassical economics provide a parsimonious
model for answering the question of how human resources serve as
a source of competitive advantage to an individual firm or a
nation. The most elementary model assumes that firms exist to
maximize shareholder value and compete only on the basis of
price. As a factor of production, labor is a cost to be
minimized. An abundant supply of cheap labor provides firms and
nations with a natural basis for using human resources for
competitive advantage. Relative labor costs determine the
international division of labor: firms locate production within
and across countries wherever the costs of workers with the
requisite skills are lowest. Following smith and Marx, modern
development economists have viewed economic growth as depending
on the extension of the market through continual increases in the
division of labor; skill specialization enhances the ability of
employees to increase productivity, and economies of scale lead
to cost reductions. Although the incorporation of human capital
theory into labor economics in the 1960s changed the conception
of labor -- from strictly a cost to a quasi-fixed capital asset
(Oi 1962; Becker 1964) -- the neoclassical approach to human
resources largely continues to treat labor as a cost to be
minimized, with the recognition that cost varies according to the
skill and productivity of workers.
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More recently, ho~ever, scholars across a number of fields
have argued that in addition to price competition, firms compete
on the basis of quality, product differentiation, technological
innovation and speed to market. Moreover, there is growing
recognition among both scholars and public policy groups that for
enterprises in advanced industrialized societies to achieve the
twin objectives of being competitive at high standards of living
for employees requires them to fully develop and utilize the
skills, motivation, and analytical problem solving potential of
their human resources. That is, human resources need to serve as
a source of strategic or competitive advantage. Over the last
decade, the argument has developed along parallel lines in three
sets of literature: flexible specialization (Brusco 1982; piore
and Sabel 1984; Pyke et ale 1990; Best 1990), strategic human
resource management (Tichy, Fombrun, and Devanna 1982; Beer et
ale 1985; Dyer 1988), and strategic industrial relations (Kochan,
Katz, McKersie 1986).
The argument generally runs along the following lines: the
inability to compete on the basis of low factor costs leads firms
in advanced industrial societies to co~pete on the basis of high
product quality, differentiation, innovation, and advances in
technology. To do so, however, requires that firms develop
particular types of high productivity human resource systems --
often referred to in the u.S. literature as high or mutual
commitment systems -- which include policies to attract,
motivate, and gain the commitment of highly skilled and flexible
8
workers (Walton 1985; Kochan and Dyer 1991).
Although this argument has gained some empirical support
(MacDuffie and Krafcik 1992; Levine and D'Andrea Tyson 1990;
Blinder et. ale 1990) and increasing acceptance in both the
research and policy making communities, as yet we have not fully
explored the extent to which human resources do in fact serve as
a source of competitive advantage for individual firms and/or
nations. This, therefore, serves as the first building block or
question for this field to address on both a clear theoretical
level and with empirical evidence.
Disagreement in the literature also exists over the extent
to which differentiated markets and new (more flexible)
technologies are more or less determinative of human resource
policies, although there is increasing agreement that new
flexible technologies are more permissive than determinative. In
the former view, product markets and technology drive firms to
adapt their labor and human resource practices in particular ways
that achieve high productivity outcomes (Piore and Sabel 1984;
Kern and Schumann 1984). An alternative but equally
deterministic view links new technologies to the deskilling of
workers (Noble 1984; Shaiken et al. 1986).
other models are less deterministic. There are a variety of
ways of achieving technological flexibility (Suarez, Cusamano,
and Fine 1991). Because new technologies are more permissive
than dedicated machinery, employer strategies playa more
significant role than they did in the past. Those that take a
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strategic human resource management approach, for example, argue
that the choice of a competitive business strategy will determine
the human resource pOlicies of the firm or its business unit
(Dyer 1988; Schuler 1992). That is, firms can choose along a
continuum of whether to compete primarily on the basis of price
or quality, and this choice will determine whether the firm
requires high skills or low wages as its primary human resource
attributes.
other researchers in political economy and industrial
relations expand the range of variation, arguing that firms may
choose along a continuum of high and low volume as well as price
and quality
-- a two-by-two matrix of alternative production
strategies that imply alternative human resource strategies as
well (Sorge and Streeck 1988). A growing body of empirical
research does suggest that the relationship between technology
and human resource policies is indeterminate (Kelley 1986; Zuboff
1988; HYman and Streeck 1988; Keefe 1991; Thomas 1991) and
depends largely on the choices made by employers and employees.
If there is debate over the relationship between technology
and human resource policies, there is also debate over what
determines employer choices. Most neo-classical economic and
game-theoretic models focus on the role of product markets and
the strategies of competitors in shaping employer strategies.
The business strategy literature likewise emphasizes the
importance of product markets and competitors (Porter 1980,
1985), as does the strategic human resource management
10
perspective (Dyer 1988).
Traditional industrial relations theory (Commons 1919), by
contrast, argued that organized labor would constrain employer
choices and managerial discretion: as product markets expanded
. .
institutions such as national unions and government standards
would ~Itakewages out of competition" and thereby limit the
ability of wage competition to drive down labor standards.
Similarly, some branches of political economy argue that
regional, sectoral, and national institutions and politics
influence or constrain firm level strategic choices; thus, they
put priority on the role of the state and institutions of
interest intermediation as key determinants of the human resource
policies open to the firm and therefore the competitive
strategies that are viable in a given environment (Goldthorpe
1984; Caws on 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Those countries
with more corporatist arrangements are seen as able to build
cooperation and communication between employers and labor at both
firm and extra-firm levels of policy-making -- thereby
facilitating the coordination of policy implementation (Sharpf
1984).
still others give more weight to the role of capital markets
and financial institutions (Zysman 1983). Some of. this work
develops a stakeholder conception of the firm in which the
governance structure and nature of the firm itself are endogenous
rather than fixed by market forces. Aoki (1988), for example,
argues that Japanese firms should be conceptualized as
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coalitions between sha~eholders and employees rather than as
instruments that exist solely to maximize shareholder wealth.
Wever and Allen (1992) make a similar argument with respect to
Germany.
This emerging body of research therefore suggests that
nations such as Japan and Germany with financial institutions and
investors who share long term time horizons with corporate
decision-makers are expected to have human resource systems or
internal labor markets that likewise emphasize long term
emploYment relationships, high levels of investments in human
capital, compensation systems that reward long tenure and
internal promotions, and a more cooperative corporate culture.
These firms, in turn, are expected to respond to exogenous demand
shocks or make structural adjustments in ways that better
accommodate employee and employer interests than has been the
case with the forms of corporate restructuring experienced in the
u.s. in the 1980s (Dore 1986: Reich 1988: Abraham and Houseman
1992: Locke 1992) -- where capital markets and the governance
structures of firms require firms to give greater emphasis to
maximizing shareholder wealth and to pursuing more short-term
profits. To the extent that mutual commitment human resource
policies require firms to make longterm investments in human
resources, nations with patient capital markets, financial
institutions, and governance structures may therefore be better
positioned to gain competitive advantage from their human
resources.
12
We see this as a very promising and pivotal hypothesis.
Thus, while still in the very early stages of development,
comparative analysis of the relationships among the sources of
capital, the structure and time horizons of financial
institutions, the governance structure of the corporation, and
human resource practices would appear to be an intriguing and
potentially rich area of research.
In summary, while there is general agreement now as to the
potential strategic value of human resources for achieving
competitive advantage at the firm and national level, there is a
lack of agreement concerning the relative importance of human
resources versus other factors such as technology, the role and
determinants of employer choice, the relative importance of
particular human resource policies, the relationship between firm
and state level policies, and the role played by financial
markets and institutions that shape the governance structures of
firms. All this suggests, however, that researchers should be
careful not to assume that an invisible hand of the market shapes
the nature and goals of corporations or the strategies they
choose to pursue these goals. If this is true, then the extent
to which human resources serve as a source of competitive
advantage may reflect the goals nations set and the way they
define the firm and its governance structure.
How competitive Advantaqe is Created Throuqh Human Resources
A second key question for research in this field concerns
13
understanding how firms and/or nations go about the task of
gaining competitive advantage through human resources. Human
capital theory provides the standard economics answer to this
question by focusing on the supply side of the labor market.
since workers are paid their marginal product and their
productivity is a function of their general education and skills
plus the specific skills required by a particular firm, it is the
stock of general and specific training that influences the
quality of the labor force and its relative productivity. Human
capital theory further specifies the relative responsibilities of
individual firms and the general society for providing training.
Individual firms will provide firm-specific training that
develops skills unique to its production system or organizational
environment for three reasons. They do this because no other
entity will supply this training, because it does not make
workers more competitive in the external labor market, and
because, therefore, it can be appropriated by the firm over
time -- assuming the worker remains with the firm. Consistent
with theories of market failure (Arrow 1974), however, general
training will be under-provided if left to individual firms since
it is portable and therefore not likely to be fully appropriable
by the firm. comparative research on the u.s. and other
countries generally supports this proposition (Kochan and
Osterman 1991).
While human capital theory only generally links investments
in human resources to skill, productivity, and wages, it provides
14
a narrow skill formation process, rather than more broadly, as a
learning process that evolves out of the structure of jObs and
career ladders (Koike and Inoki 1990) and includes the social and
little guidance for purposes of strategic human resource
management. Moreover, although intended to be universally
applicable, its assumptions grow out of the context of American
labor markets and mass-production industries at a particular
historical period. The dichotomy between general and specific
skills, for example, has been much more salient in u.s. mass
production industries than, for example, in Japanese style human
resource systems. Similarly, the theory conceives of training as
psychological experience of workers in an organizational
environment (Cole 1989). Finally, human capital theory has
nothing to say about what, if any, human resource policies should
accompany the training in order for it to be effective or about
how production must be organized in order to take advantage of
training. In other words, it does not link the argument for
investment in human resources to business strategy, a theory of
the firm, or an understanding of the relationship between the
firm and its external environment.
Recently a stream of economic analysis described as the "new
economics of personnel" has sought to go beyond human capital
theory by linking productivity to the strategic use of incentive
policies (Mitchell and Zaidi 1990; Ehrenberg 1990). This work
builds on the rapidly expanding literature on the economics of
industrial organization (Coase 1937; Alchien and Demsetz 1972;
15
Williamson 1975; Putterman 1986; stiglitz 1991; Simon 1991) that
takes as its basic theoretical task the explanation of why
firms -- and by extension -- emploYment contracts of different
durations and structures -- exist at all in market economies.
These models are extended to the study of human resource policy
by the derived proposition that firms will internalize labor
contracts to coordinate', monitor, and motivate employees (rather
than simply depend on the market to structure the emploYment
contract) whenever the collective efforts of "teams" of employees
can be more productive than the efforts of individuals working
separately in the external labor market. Where coordination
(organizations) can be more efficient, the task then turns to the
appropriate human resource policies (or the incentive structures
of the contract) to achieve these efficiencies. Agency theory
(Berle and Means 1933: Jensen and Meckling 1976), for example,
seeks to remedy conflicts of interest between the organization
and the individual by constructing market-like incentive
contracts such as employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and
contingent pay schemes.
Researchers have also extended these models to explain the
relationship between efficiency wages and other personnel
policies such as emploYment security, closeness of monitoring and
supervision, and employee discipline. By attempting to examine
the interrelationships among different personnel policies rather
than treat each as an isolated or independent choice, this work
takes an important step forward. Yet in some ways these
16
perspectives are merely catching up with a literatures on
internal labor markets (Kerr 1954; Doeringer and Piore 1971;
Osterman 1984, 1988) that have long argued that personnel
policies must be seen as linked together in a coherent fashion
to the competitive strategies and governance structures of the
firm. We will now turn to an examination of the propositions
that these latter literatures suggest for how firms gain
strategic advantage from their human resource policies.
Internal labor market and industrial relations researchers
contribute to the study of human resource management in at least
two important ways. First, as noted above, they view the choice
of the full range of personnel policies and practices as
interrelated and mutually reinforcing for them to achieve their
maximum desired effects on organizational performance. Second,
they see these choices as not uniquely determined by efficiency
considerations. Rather firm choices with respect to personnel as
well as other policies are embedded in a social, political, and
institutional context and therefore influenced by the ideologies
or beliefs, interests, power relations, and historical
experiences of those who participate in setting these policies.
This perspective, we will argue, is essential for any theory of
the competitive advantage of human resource policies; but it
takes on even greater importance when seeking to explain how
human resource practices and their effects on performance vary in
different international and cultural settings.
Osterman (1984, 1987, 1988), for example, goes considerably
17
beyond economic perspectives of internal labor markets which
emphasize efficiency (eg., Williamson 1985) as well as
sociological perspectives that focus on promotion rules and
career development (Baron 1984; Arthur, Hall, and Lawrence
1989). Rather, employers create different types of emploYment
subsystems for different labor markets and each subsystem is
characterized by an interrelated set of policies governing
training, job design, promotion, employment security, and
compensation policies. Kochan, Katz, and Mckersie's (1986)
industrial relations model additionally suggests that three tiers
of organizational pOlicies are interrelated: workplace practices
(involving labor management relations, work organization, and
employee participation); personnel level policies (of
compensation, training, and employment security); and corporate
strategy issues involving the choice of a competitive strategy,
the level of involvement of labor representatives and/or human
resource professionals in strategic decisions and governance
processes, and the basic values or beliefs that influence those
who participate in these broad firm decisions and long run
strategies.
Empirical research supports this perspective. For example,
union representation on boards of directors in u.s. corporations
or under German Codetermination, in and of itself, does not
substantially affect productivity levels (Svejnar 1982).
Similarly, Levine and D'Andrea Tyson (1990) compare the
arrangements for, and impacts of, employee participation in
18
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producer cooperatives in Mondragon, Spain and other parts of
Europe as well as large Swedish, Japanese, and u.S. firms with
"high commitment" work relations. They find that the
relationship between participation and productivity is shaped by
four factors: "gain sharing, long-term employment relations,
measures to build group cohesiveness, and guaranteed individual
rights for employees" (1990:184).
MacDuffie and Krafcik (1992) reach comparable results based
on the comparative evidence of 70 automotive assembly plants in
17 countries. For firms to be "world class competitors," they
must adopt a combined human resource/flexible technology
production strategy. The human re~ource practices associated
with high performance include: mUltskilling, extensive off- and
on-the-job training, work teams, job rotation, worker
participation in problem-solving and production decisions, and
mutual commitment incentive structures (employment security;
compensation that is partially contingent on corporate, plant,
and/or individual performance; and low status barriers between
management and workers) .
As noted above, political economists and industrial
relations scholars contribute to a fuller understanding of human
resource policies by noting that the discretion over the choice
of an internal labor market system or human resource strategy may
be only partly left to decision-making at the firm level.
Employers and unions may influence public policy which in turn
shapes market conditions for all firms. Research over the last
19
decade, for example, has demonstrated the role of employers
associations in shaping state industrial and labor policy (Vogel
1978; Harris 1982; Gospel and Littler 1983; Windmuller and
Gladstone 1984; Sisson 1987; Tolliday and zeitlin 1991; Jacoby
1985; 1991). Similarly, as indicated above, research on
corporatist interest representation identifies the importance of
variation in labor union strategies beyond the firm level for
shaping emploYment conditions on a regional, sectoral, or
national level. state policies, industry associations, and/or
the power of unions all can shape and constrain firm discretion
and set standards that reverse the causal arrow -- in this case
the constraints of labor standards limit the types of competitive
strategies that are viable. Thus, human resource pOlices drive
competitive strategies and over time influence managerial values
and attitudes.
Some international research supports this view. In a
comparative study of the German and u.S. auto industries, for
example, Streeck (1987) found that in contrast to the u.s.
experience, the powerful IG Metall union constrained German
employers' ability to compete on the basis of wage and emploYment
cuts, thereby providing an incentive for employers to compete on
product quality and to internally reorganize production to
achieve higher levels of productivity. In a comparable study,
Turner (1990) reaches a similar conclusion. Similarly, based on
interviews conducted outside of the metalworking sector, Wever
(1992) reports that works councils are not only widely accepted
20
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but viewed as positive institutions by German managers. Thus,
state-mandated institutions of worker representation not only
influence managerial behavior but also, over time, apparently
induce shifts in attitudes as well.
Some political economists and industrial relations scholars
further argue that the extent to which cooperation and
coordination of policy occurs between firms, unions, and the
state determines the competitive advantage of firms and nations
in confronting the international economy. Unions may playa
positive role in economic stabilization (Flanagan, Soskice, and
Ulman 1983). The argument is that coordinated and negotiated
interest representation, or corporatism, allows firms and nations
to respond better to exogenous shocks and market uncertainties
and achieve lower une~ployment levels. Governments are freer to
use expansionary monetary and fiscal.policy when centralized
collective bargaining can by relied on to guarantee wage
restraint (Sharpf 1984). Newell and Symons (1985) review the
wage-employment relationship in five countries -- Sweden,
Germany, Britain, Japan, and the united State -- in decreasing
order of corporatism; they find that more corporatist economies
respond better to exogenous shocks. Moreover, correlating
unemployment levels with corporatist and non-corporatist episodes
within each country, they show that external shocks result in far
more unemployment when countries are pursuing noncorporatist
policies -- twice as much in Germany, three times as much in
Japan, and six times as much in the United Kingdom. others find
21
that countries with highly centralized (Sweden and Austria) and
highly decentralized (the united states, Japan, and Switzerland)
bargaining arrangements have lower unemployment rates -- but note
that whereas centralized bargaining also produces wage
compression, decentralized arrangements produce high wage
dispersion and low wage levels on average (Calmfors and Driffill
1988: Freeman 1988). The internationalization of the economy in
the last two decades, however, has put intense pressure on
corporatist arrangements, decreasing the ability of unions to
take wages out of competition, and it is unclear whether such
arrangements will continue to play the role they have played in
the past (Boyer 1988).
In summary, a number of points of agreement emerge out of
these literatures on the question of how firms and/or nations
develop human resources for competitive advantage. First, all
of these literatures accept and build on human capital theory by
noting that a well educated and trained labor force is the key
supply side characteristic needed if firms are to compete on any
basis other than minimizing factor (labor) costs and prices.
Second, researchers generally agree that labor force skills and
quality must be matched with a series of other human resource
policies that reinforce and utilize these skills in the
production process. Thus, the interdependence of human resource
policies and technology or production strategies and the
complementary nature of technology and production strategies is
recognized. Third, the interrelated nature of human resource
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policies is gaining acceptance among both the new economics and
the traditional personnel/human resource management literatures.
Training, compensation, employment staffing and security, work
organization, trust and employee relations are more widely
recognized as an interdependent bundle of practices rather than
as a menu of isolated functional activities from which firms can
make independent choices. Fourth, there is growing recognition
that these policies are closely linked to competitive strategies
of the firm, although, as we will note below, the causal nature
of these relationships remains in some dispute among the
different approaches to the field. Fifth, the organizational
economists, industrial relations, and political economists all
share an interest in the governance structure of the firm and
recognize, for different reasons, that the nature of
organizational governance will influence the nature of the
employment contract and human resource policies.
Yet despite these areas of convergence and consensus among
the different schools of thought, there remains considerable
theoretical debate over issues such as whether human resource
policies are driven by factors beyond efficiency; how important
is it to have formal voice or representation for workers in
strategy making and organizational governance or whether human
resource professionals can and do serve this role as agents for
employee interests; how important is it to take into account the
social and institutional embeddedness of organizational decision-
making; and what the future role of national level institutions
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governing the employment relation will be. These areas of
debate will become more important as we explore the next issue
that we see as critical to this field of inquiry -- namely, how
human resource strategies affect worker standards of living and
other equity interests of society.
Human Resource strategies and Employee Interests
The field of human resource studies must not only be
concerned with how human resource management polices affect the
economic performance of individual enterprises or national
economies. It must also examine the other half of the twin
objectives noted at the outset of this paper, namely the effects
of different employment policies and practices on employee
interests and social welfare.
Neoclassical economics answers this distributional question
quite clearly. Social welfare is maximized when employees' wages
equal their marginal products regardless of competitive
strategies or governance arrangements. Those pOlicies that
increase productivity and firm performance will as a natural
byproduct improve real incomes and the standards of living in
society. Spending on personnel policies over and beyond the
marginal products of a firm's labor force results in rents that
produce inefficient resource allocations and economic inequality.
Industrial relations theorists have historically challenged
this perspective by arguing that productivity improvements are a
necessary but not sufficient condition to insure the equitable
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distribution of productivity gains with employees and in society.
This may be most visible when countries are in the early stages
of industrialization. CUrrently, for example, in newly
idustrializi~g countries such as Korea, governments have followed
a development strategy of "growth first, share later" (Kim 1990),
and thus worker incomes have lagged considerably behind the rates
of productivity and economic growth experienced in that country
between 1960 and 1985. Labor movements have historically arisen
to respond to such a lack of equitable gain-sharing. Thus,
industrial relations scholars view unregulated labor market
competition as a threat to worker standards because of the
unequal balance of power that'often characterizes emploYment
relationships. The role of unions', labor standards legislation,
and institutions such as collective bargaining, works councils,
codetermination, or other forums for employee voice has been to
create protected or "internal labor markets" and to "take wages
out of competition," -- that is, to limit management's ability to
compete on the basis of low labor costs. By driving up wages and
improving other labor standards, unions have pushed employers to
search for offsetting productivity gains and/or other improved
competitive strategies that would allow them to survive as high
wage employers. unions have also sought to further stabilize
emploYment conditions and reduce management resistance to
improvements by standardizing conditions across the product and
labor markets in which the firm competed and thereby completing
the process of "taking wages out of competition."
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According to this perspective then, to the extent that
unions succeed in expanding their scope of influence over
regional, sectoral, and national markets, they represent a force
for greater social and economic equality in the society as a
whole. Unions, for example, have a net positive effect on wage
compression (Freeman and Medoff 1984), a factor also associated
with increased cooperation and productivity in the literature on
incentive contracts reviewed above. Unions may improve equality
in a number of ways: by extending collective bargaining to larger
numbers of workers, by negotiating in key firms or sectors and
pushing the government to extend wage bargains to non-union
workplaces, or by influencing social and labor legislation
applicable to all employers and workers.
Political economists in the corporatist tradition further
argue that trade unions that are centralized and adopt inclusive
political strategies are likely to have a greater positive impact
on social and economic equality (eg., Goldthorpe 1984). Thus,
researchers generally find higher levels of wage compression in
more centralized or corporatist economies (Calmfors and Driffill
1988; Freeman 1988). Where labor movements are more fragmented
as in the united states, they are less likely to be able to
offset the labor market segmentation arising from business cycles
and differences in product markets, technology, ownership
structures (Piore 1975; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1975, 1982).
A significant body of empirical research supports the theories of
labor market segmentation as applied to the U.s. (Dickens and
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Lang 1985: Bulow and Summers 1986: Dickens and Katz 1987: Krueger
and Summers 1988).
Despite higher levels of unionization and corporatism,
however, labor markets in Western Europe and Japan have also been
characterized by dualism (Berger and Piore 1980), with "insiders"
enjoying substantial employment security and "outsiders" enduring
long-term unemployment (Blanchard and Summers 1986). Japanese
labor markets have been characterized as providing lifetime
security for a core of workers in large corporations while a
periphery of workers in temporary jobs or in smaller independent
enterprises absorb demand fluctuations (Dore 1986). Aoki (1988)
notes that this is one expected outcome of the goverance
structure of Japanese firms.
More recently, labor market analysts have suggested that the
restructuring of internal labor markets in the u.S. and Western
Europe is resegmenting the work force along such core/periphery
dimensions within firms (Osterman 1988; Pfeffer and Baron 1988).
The increased use of less secure, non-regular forms of labor
contracts (part-time, temporary, contingent) has been observed
cross-nationally (Appelbaum 1989; Casey et. ale 1989; Standing
1991). Moreover, in most instances cross-nationally, women,
minorities, immigrants, and older workers bear a disproportionate
share of the costs of cyclical and structural adjustment (Henwood
and Wyatt 1987; Christopherson 1988; Standing 1991).
If the effect of unionization is to improve social and
economic equality, then the relative decline in unions cross-
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nationally in the last decade as well as the shift to more
decentralized bargaining structures (Edwards et. ale 1986;
Gourevitch 1989; Visser 1991; Blanchflower and Freeman 1990)
increases the likelihood of greater wage inequality in advanced
industrial nations. While union structure and density only
partially determine wages, it is noteworthy that cross-national
studies of changes in the structure of wages find increasing
within group inequality in some countries (U.S., U.K.) but not
others (France, Japan) (Katz and Revenga 1989; Katz and Loveman
1991). Clearly, this is an area in which further empirical
research is needed.
To summarize our argument in this section, the clearest
proposition to flow from combining the competitive strategy and
industrial relations perspective is that competitive strategies
that emphasize high quality, differentiation, and innovation are
necessary conditions for producing human resource policies and
practices that result in high standards of living for employees.
The industrial relations scholars would further-argue that
employee voice or strong human resource management participation
in these policies is necessary for maintaining high standards and
translating these competitive strategies into profitable outcomes
that are equitably shared between employees and shareholders.
Political economists add that the level of society-wide equality
depends upon union organization and the more or less inclusive
strategies which unions undertake.
Moreover, there remains an empirical question separating the
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human resource management researchers and those in the industrial
relations tradition -- namely whether the commitment of top
managers and the integration of human resource executives within
the top decision-making structure of firms serves as a vehicle
for employee voice as effectively as other independent and
legally sanctioned mechanisms such as collective bargaining,
codetermination, consultation, and works councils.
Another proposition challenges the strategic human resource
management literature to go beyond the boundaries of the
individual firm to assess how the broader society and employee
population is affected by the combination of firm specific and
state directed (required and encouraged) human resource policies.
Leaving all policies to the firm is expected to produce
inequality in labor market outcomes and economic welfare since
those on the "inside" of corporate standards will receive
significant welfare advantages compared to those who remain in
peripheral jobs and labor market statuses. This again argues for
supplementing micro or firm specific models of human resource
policy with a broader model that considers the effects of
different institutional and social policy arrangements on the
labor force in its entirety. The key question here becomes how
wide is the coverage of human resource policies and practices
that achieve both high levels of competitiveness and high
standards of living. We now turn to a more direct examination of
this question.
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Diffusion of Human Resource strateaies
Concern over the diffusion of human resource strategies that
enable firms and societies to gain strategic advantage are not
only, as suggested above, important for their effects on the
broader society. To the extent that the strategic choices of
firms are interdependent, absent some broader collective
coordination or requirement to comply, a market failure will
occur that produces an under investment in these policies (Arrow
1974). Neoclassical theory would respond that if practices
improve productivity and economic efficiency for an individual
firm, the practice will spread naturally via market forces. But
in the case of investments in highly portable training and human
resources, the market is unlikely to be sufficient because no
individual firm can capture the full return on its investment
(Kochan and Osterman 1990). Case studies suggest that those
firms that have tried on their own to invest more heavily in
longterm human resource strategies have been unable to sustain
them (Kochan, MacDuffie, Osterman 1988).
Others recognize that there are systemic social and
political barriers to diffusion of new human resource strategies
both within corporations and across society. Industrial
relations and internal labor market researchers who conceptualize
strategic decision-making and organizational governance as a
political process involving contests among competing interests
for scarce resources recognize that deep seated values,
ideologies, and considerations of power and control all influence
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the extent to which firms are willing to commit to a human
resource strategy that increases costs with the promise of future
competitive advantage.
The role of institutions outside or beyond the level of the
firm become central to debates over the diffusion of human
resource strategies and practices. Industrial relations and
political economists would generally agree with the proposition
introduced above that the more centralized the structure of
bargaining, the more economic policy making is conducted through
corporatist structures, and the broader the scope of union
coverage, the more widely diffused will be human resource
strategies and practices that are capable of achieving the twin
qoals of competitiveness and high standards of living. The
common characteristics of these institutional arrangements is
that they take some of the range of choice or discretion over
both competitive strategies and labor standards away from
individual firms.
The specific strategies, policies, or institutional
arrangements used to diffuse human resource practices, and their
relative effectiveness, varies across countries and continues to
be subject of considerable debate. Recent research has, for
example, documented the decline of the formal, highly centralized
European style corporatist structures that were popular in the
1950s through the 1970s (Boyer 1988; Swenson 1989; Martin 1991).
State directed corporatism without strong inputs from labor as
found in Japan (Sharai 1983) and Korea (1m 1990) has also been
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criticized for emphasizing competitiveness over living standards
(i.e., the growth first, share later strategy). Australia has
recently been described as a nation that is moving from a highly
centralized and rigid system of national industrial relations to
one that is following a labor initiated and labor led strategy of
economic restructuring designed to promote greater efficiency and
competitiveness through reforms in work organization, skill
enhancement, and compensation at the individual firm level. In
Canada, various tripartite labor market and training institutions
have been put in place and a number of key labor unions are now
urging firms and policy makers to adopt a high skills strategy in
an effort to avoid what they fear would otherwise be an
Americanization of industrial relations and human resource
standards as a result of the recent Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement. Whether the Canadian labor movement can translate its
emerging views on this issue into firm level strategies capable
of sustaining high labor standards and competitive industries and
firms in its increasingly open economy is both an open question
and a golden opportunity for future research. Finally, countries
such as the U.S. and Britain provide an opportunity to observe
the rate of diffusion in more unregulated environments --
environments in which unions have particularly lost political
power in the 1980s, where few, if any, significant macro or cross
firm institutional structures for promoting diffusion exist, and
where economic policy makers have yet to accept the argument that
state policy has an important role to play in diffusing standards
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and practices if a nation is to gain competitive advantage from
its human resources. Thus, this is perhaps an area where theory
is still rather weak but where opportunities for cross-national
comparative research are readily available.
Even if some corporations succeed in achieving high quality,
high commitment human resource systems, two other questions
remain open for debate over diffusion. First, if diffusion
depends on the extent of demand for high quality differentiated
goods, can all firms compete in these markets, or will
unregulated international competition drive down prices and erode
the ability of firms and nations to support costly human resource
systems on a wide scale? In the U.S., for example, even the most
successful firms with high commitment systems have had to cut
back on human resource costs and employment security pledges.
Second, do high commitment production systems depend upon the
simultaneous existence of secondary firms that absorb demand
fluctuations or produce low cost inputs? If so, then the
location of these enterprises will depend heavily on national
policies governing the flow of capital, labor, and products
across national boundaries. All these are questions that need
further investigation in the broader domain of international
human resource studies we are advocating here.
Transferrinq Human Resource Practices Across National Borders
Since the 1960s and the landmark international industrial
relations project by Kerr et al (1960) scholars have debated the
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question of whether or not human resource management and
industrial relations systems were converging toward a single,
common model driven largely by the pressures of
industrialization. The convergence hypothesis has fallen out of
favor in recent years with studies that have demonstrated the
diversity of practices among and within national systems (Dore
1973; Maurice, Sellier, Silvestre 1986). Yet in the 1980s
considerable interest has been rekindled in the more narrow
question of the extent to which practices that work effectively
in one country and culture can be exported to others. This issue
is central, for example, to most of the international human
resource management research dealing with questions of degree of
centralized policies versus decentralized, local control and
discretion and the type of training, management development, and
local staffing firms need to use in managing international
subsidiaries and global operations.
Neoclassical theory would answer this question quite simply:
if a practice has demonstrated ability to improve productivity it
will spread as fast as the information about it crosses national
boundaries. others disagree, especially those who view
employment relationships as embedded deep within the culture and
social structure of a society. At the extreme, organizational
culture theorists (Schein 1985) would argue that no two
organizations let alone societies will replicate the effects of a
given practice in equivalent fashion -- the cultures are too
impenetrable. Yet clearly, the transfer of knowledge and
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technology does occur across national boundaries.
A position that builds on the recognition of on-going
international borrowing draws on institutional industrial
relations and internal labor market traditions: single practices
cannot be transplanted with equivalent effects unless the broader
institutional and/or organizational practices in which they are
embedded are likewise carried over and adapted to the new
setting.
Based on her historical examination of Japanese
organizations, Westney (1987) adds a further proposition:
practices can be imported from other cultures but do not result
in straight imitation. Instead, the process of introducing new
practices itself results in institutional innovations that over
time create a new practice out of the one being borrowed from
abroad. Thus the process of borrowing from other countries is
not one that produces convergence through imitation but one that
produces innovation from institutional adaptation. As in the
case of the issues involving diffusion, this is an area where
theory and careful empirical analysis has yet to catch up to
speculation, prescriptive writing and practical experimentation
by firms faced with the pragmatic challenges of managing gl~bal
operations. We expect this set of issues to playa prominent
role in future research in this field.
PART III: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH
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Implications for Policy and Practice
A central argument of this paper is that by expanding and
deepening the range of questions and theoretical literatures
brought to bear on international human resource studies, new and
richer insights could be offered for a broader range of options
for practitioners and policy makers than has been generated by
prior approaches to this subject. For employers (especially
human resource management professionals) the central insight that
we see flowing from this broader, more integrated perspective is
that their ability to promote and sustain high standard human
resource policies and practices depends not only on their own
power and status within their individual firm but also on the
power and status of other human resource and labor professionals
and institutions (such as unions and government regulations) in
their society. In another paper (Kochan and Dyer 1991), we argue
that this recognition challenges human resource professionals to
. modify the strategy for change they have emphasized in the 1980s
from one dominat~d by the need to form partnerships with line
managers and senior corporate executives to a broader coalitional
model that includes the external groups, interests, and
institutional agents.
For labor representatives we see this broadened focus as
opening up their strategic options for influencing human resource
choices. This is an especially important challenge for union
leaders given the internationalization of capital, technology,
and product markets. If labor has any hope for reversing its
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declining power and membership in advanced industrialized
economies it must find ways to go beyond traditional national-
based strategies for taking wages out of competition. It will
need to find ways to participate at many levels of the economy,
from participation in formulating competitive strategies at the
firm level to regional and national coalition building with other
social movements.
For government policy makers the message is equally clear.
No longer_can labor and human resource policies be effectively
separated from macro economic policies regulating interest rates,
financial markets, trade, and public and private investment. All
of these are tightly interrelated and affect the extent to which
human resources can be developed and fully utilized to achieve
the twin objectives of competitiveness and high living standards.
Finally, for international agencies such as the ILO, this
perspective provides a new way of thinking about how to approach
its technical assistance to individual countries and its
assessment of the extent to which country practices are in
compliance with ILO principles and conventions in a world where
national boundaries have lost some of their significance.
Specifically, this perspective suggests that the ILO would
benefit from a closer examination of firm specific human resource
policies but in doing so needs to keep in mind the
interrelationships between individual firm and broader state and
labor institutions and pOlicies.
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Implications for Future Research
Clearly the dominant implication for research that flows
from this paper Is that it is time to rekindle interest in
comparative human resource research but to do so in a fashion
that overcomes the narrow prescriptive approaches that dominate
much of the international human resource management research and
the industrial relations research that seldom goes beyond the
stage of describing broad features of national systems or
institutional patterns. By building on the insights of
economics, political economy, internal labor markets, industrial
relations, and strategic human resource management, we believe a
new more theoretically rich and empirically informative body of
research can be developed and sustained in the years ahead.
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